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Unlikely Doves: Counter-terrorism Experts

Unlikely Doves: Counter-terrorism Experts
David Corn, AlterNet
September 28, 2001

The threat of terrorism cannot be effectively countered unless the United
States changes its arrogant, me-first global ways and faces up to the fact
that many people in other lands are -- rightly or wrongly -- damn angry at
it. This proposition has become something of a mantra among progressives who
counsel restraint in response to the horrific attacks of September 11. But
it also is a sentiment popular within a subset of the national security
establishment: counter-terrorism experts.

I am not suggesting that all the I-know-terrorism talking heads you watch on
television are sensitive souls who place a priority on understanding root
causes. But since September 11, I have attended several what-to-do-about
terrorism meetings in Washington, and I have been surprised to see that many
prominent terrorism wonks believe the United States cannot rely solely on a
military response and must also re-examine its foreign policy and actions
abroad in order to diminish the threat of terrorism at home.

At one conference, Jerrold Post, who was a psychological profiler at the
CIA for 21 years and who pioneered the government's effort to fathom
the psychology of terrorism, noted the "real dilemma" is the existence of
"roiling hatred within the Arab world directed at the United States ...
America doesn't have the vaguest idea how much hatred."

Terrorists, Post maintained, exploit people's "feelings of despair over
economic conditions ... and [over] totalitarian regimes." He noted the
effort against terrorism is "not a military struggle in many ways." Post
added, "I do worry about the militarization of the conflict, particularly
when civilian populations become casualties ... There is a hazard in the
[war] metaphor, if taken too literally ... It could widen that polarization
[between the United States and large segments of the Arab world]."

Shibley Telhami, an academic and mainstream think-tanker specializing in
the Middle East, said of the Osam bin Laden outfit, "this group captures a
popular mood in the region." He also suggested that the United States must
mount a "reduction of anger" initiative and that "the shortest answer is
moving on the Israeli-Arab peace process."

Some of the people who know terrorism best are warning the public not to
expect too much from military force -- in terms of reducing the threat of
terrorism. At the same meeting, Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at the
Rand Corporation, said military action, while appropriate, "should not be
seen as the answer." H. Allen Holmes, a former assistant secretary at both
the Defense Department and the Department of State, asserted that any use of
force must be accompanied by a U.S. diplomatic effort that seeks to improve
the image of America overseas. "We must provide assistance and listen to
other states, including states heretofore regarded as rogue states," he
said, adding that "there is a strong belief [in the Middle East] that great
powers manipulate the governments of the region, and the United States is
seen by many as the big manipulator and has become identified with
governments unpopular in the region."

A rough consensus might be the following: the attack of September 11 -- the
work of evil fascistic extremists -- should not be viewed free of
geopolitical context. None of these experts are rationalizing the attack.
They are merely realistically assessing larger factors that must be
considered when crafting a coherent counterterrorism strategy. After the
conference, Holmes, who has served as ambassador to Japan, South Korea and
other nations, elaborated: "In a war on terrorism, there will be no victory.
We can contain it, slow it down, diminish it. But only if we put together a
grand coalition for the long haul to do something about the sources of
terrorism. Pakistan has 40 percent illiteracy, a low GNP, so the mosques are
turning out terrorists ... We will never abandon Israel, but we need a
different idea of how to be a broker. We are so identified with one side of
that conflict."

Holmes needed no translator: to curtail terrorism, the United States must
change its foreign policies. Doing so will not sway the most fanatical and
murderous thugs, such as Osama bin Laden and his crew. They appear to crave
a bloody religious war not better wages for Yemeni workers. But the goal --
long-term, to be sure -- is to make it harder for mass-murderers of this
sort to recruit followers and win support from portions of the public (such
as those Pakistanis who have demonstrated in favor of bin Laden) _and_ to
render it easier for the United States and other nations to form
multilateral endeavors that can root out and punish terrorists.

A just conclusion to the Israel-Palestinian conflict would probably not
convince bin Laden to renounce his war against Americans and Jews. But a
resolution there could remove one large complication in the effort to align
nations (and their people) against bin Laden. A counterterrorism strategy
that takes into account US foreign policy in this manner is not on the minds
of many members of Congress or Bush Administration officials. President Bush
does keep saying his war on terrorism is a battle for freedom and tolerance
that pits "legitimate" governments against rogues. But try telling that to
dissidents in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Or Pakistan, now ruled by a general who
gained power through a coup. The only foreign policy changes Bush seems to
be contemplating are those that lend support to ruthless heads of state who
sign up for Bush's war. See Vladimir Putin and Chechnya.

Several days after the abovementioned conference, the House intelligence
subcommittee on terrorism held a rare public hearing. Appearing as a
witness, Lee Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman who recently served
on a national commission on terrorism, noted that members of the commission
visited 28 countries and encountered "a deep resentment about what the
United States stood for and were told that managing that resentment will be
one of the major foreign policy challenges" for the United States.

None of the members of the committee asked Hamilton to expand upon this.
Instead, the lawmakers mostly wondered about which agencies were best
prepared to respond to terrorist attacks and how much much authority would
be granted to Tom Ridge, who's been appointed by Bush to a new Cabinet-level
counterterrorism position. After the hearing, I asked Hamilton what could be
done to manage the resentment he mentioned. He first noted there is a "sharp
distinction between resentment and hostility." The latter motivated the
September 11 attackers, and that antipathy cannot be countered. "The broader
foreign policy problem," he explained, "is resentment. Hostility swims in
the resentment."

So what can be done about this resentment? Hamilton had only the mildest of
suggestions: "What you do is listen. Style makes a difference in the conduct
of American foreign policy. We have a reputation for not listening, for
being very arrogant, for insisting it is done our way."

My next question was obvious: beyond listening better, what concrete policy
measures should the United States adopt and has the Bush administration
bolstered America's reputation for being arrogant? Before I could finish the
query, Hamilton was gone. Even though he had raised the resentment issue,
he, too, appeared more comfortable discussing bureaucratic reorganizations.

The need to think beyond military solutions was also raised at a bizarre
talk given by Jeff "Skunk" Baxter before a group of military policymeisters,
defense contractors, and Defense Department employees a few days after the
attack. Weeks before September 11, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
a Pentagon-friendly think tank, had asked Baxter, who was a lead guitarist
for the Doobie Brothers and Steely Dan and a music-technology wiz before
fashioning himself into a military-technology expert, to present the case
for a national missile defense. After the World Trace Center and Pentagon
attacks, Baxter -- with his droopy mustache and old-guy pony tail -- was
still happy to do so. He argued that in the post-9/11 world, missile defense
remains "imperative" because China still could intimidate the United States
by threatening to launch one or more of its two dozen or so nuclear
missiles. Beijing, he claimed, would not be deterred by a U.S.
0counterstrike: "If we launch a nuclear attack against China -- all we do is
solve their housing crisis." He maintained that Chinese leaders do not think
about "protecting the public." So imagine, he commanded his audience, if in
the midst of another September 11-like event, China moved against Taiwan
and told Washington, back off or we'll take out Los Angeles. How could the
president appear on television and say, I am going to prosecute a war in
Taiwan, and America must prepare for further casualties?

Here was an undiluted Star Wars fanatic. What was interesting, however, was
that even a hawk like Baxter, who is a consultant to the Pentagon, saw the
limits of a counterterrorism policy that depends upon military action. The
problem, as he put it, is the United States faces an adversary driven by
powerful forces: "You live in a dirt-poor place, but if you blow yourself up
in the name of Allah, you'll get 73 virgins, all the dope you can smoke, a
backstage passes to Bruce Springsteen ... How do we nullify and negate that
threat?" Simple, he said: "The way to keep a kamikaze pilot out of aircraft
... is to deal with it at the source" -- that is, the motivation.

The goal of U.S. policy, he said, should be to "re-engineer the perceptions
of our enemies." Suicide bombers have to be convinced "they get nothing for
dying for Allah," and the people who support terrorists -- leaders or
commoners -- have to be persuaded such violence is an insult to Islam and
counterproductive. So Baxter proposed a Manhattan Project of "perception
engineering," which would explore and develop a variety of means:
psychological warfare, propaganda campaigns designed by advertising
executives ("these guys were selling Chevrolets when they were crap with the
'heartbeat of America'"); nanomachines that can invade the circulatory
system and effect the brain and thought patterns of the target; cultural
products that can engender warm feelings toward the United States. "This
World War III is a different war," Baxter commented. "It's an information
war ... a war fought with ideas ... I can give you a valium and make you
feel good. I can give you a musical score and engineer your perceptions ...
All this is doable."

The audience's positive response was intriguing. Most listeners appeared to
accept his premise that motivation and causation had to be addressed.
Baxter, of course, skipped past the possibility that persons who harbor
ill-will toward the United States might possess legitimate grievances about,
say, economic conditions, the repressive conduct of governments backed by
Washington, or the pervasive influence of American culture. His answer was
not to solve problems, but to manipulate the responses to problems.
Nevertheless, his kooky proposal focused on ideas, not missiles.

Actually, the key to a counter-terrorism strategy is ideals, not missiles.
If the evidence is strong that bin Laden and his gang executed the September
11 attack -- and as of this writing, the Bush Administration has yet to
present the case -- then these evildoers ought to be targeted. It would be
better to capture bin Laden and his lieutenants, than to blast them --
especially if the latter entails civilian deaths, causes a larger refugee
crisis and, thus, fuels further resentment. But even if bin Laden is, as the
war pundits like to say, "taken out," a difficult set of tasks will remain:
to reconfigure U.S. policy, to make changes in American conduct abroad, and
to transform not perceptions but the ugly realities faced by many in the
Third World. The job, no less, is to make the United States a force for
social justice overseas. Yes, that's a leftie cliche. But don't take the
word of do-gooding, Kumbaya progressives. Just ask some of the national
security experts.