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Glossary

The USDA meat/poultry inspectors' point of view about their employer, the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, and deregulation

The Roots of FSIS Workplace Violence

By: An anonymous AFGE Local 1188 inspector

September 2000

The tragic events of June 21 in San Leandro have deeply touched all FSIS employees, but perhaps none more than all field employees who find themselves on the "front line" each day. Are we in harm's way each time we report to duty? Tough question to answer, but the very nature of the job, which is enforcement, would seem to suggest the possibility certainly does exist. The sheer power that we possess over the industries that we regulate, however tempered, hopefully, by mutual respect and professionalism, cannot be understated. It is when we must utilize that power, in the best interest of the consumer, that we place ourselves in possible jeopardy. That possibility is dramatically intensified when we find ourselves in opposition to the policies of our employing Agency, which we none-the-less must enforce. The FSIS has created a climate among employees that inspires survival rather than loyalty, because of an ideology that contrasts with its very purpose for its existence, which is consumer protection.

This correspondence is in no way to be imputed as assigning culpability to any person or entity for the irrational behavior of an obviously disturbed individual. It's intent is to document the profound adverse impact this administration's policies have had on the industry and in particular, the FSIS in-plant workforce. Hindsight, it is said, is 20-20. In this case, that does not suffice to determine the cause/effect relationship that left three people lifeless. However, it is incumbent on each of us to do everything possible to prevent a replay at another time, another place. This is offered in that spirit.

The indisputable fact of the matter is that virtually every regulatory issue, every personnel policy promulgated by the FSIS in the last several years has served to build an atmosphere of hostility that incites the temperament of both regulator and regulated. As regulators, we deal face to face with an industry inundated with new "rules" unprecedented in the annals of food production, in the name of food safety. Inarguably, consumer protection demands continual improvement to food safety programs. The FSIS, seemingly intoxicated with its perceived power, promulgates regulations, programs and policies that are not only highly controversial, but also clearly contrary to consumer priorities. These do not contemplate the enhancement of existing controls, as promised, but instead are meant to displace those controls that have successfully served as the bedrock values of food safety. The FSIS seeks congressional and public support for these misguided ideas under the guise of properly utilizing program resources. It is common knowledge that the FSIS plans to dramatically reduce its resources (the in-plant workforce) in the coming years, in favor of a FDA style industry self-inspection. All current programs are intended to eliminate as many front line inspectors as possible. This is the sole intent of the 696 series, HIMP, PR/HACCP, the dissolution of PQC's, etc.. The newest threat to employees, innocuously called "randomization of processing inspection" is simply the elimination of second shift positions, and overtime, to the delight of the industry and the dismay of employees.

One would think that the recent losses in court, principally the Supreme Beef case and the HIMP case, would prompt the FSIS to reconsider it's disastrous, and now illegal, course of action. Not so, it's business as usual, authority or no authority. The FSIS has ways to counter defeat, as Supreme Beef, by all accounts, has learned. Unfortunately, the inspectors assigned to Supreme Beef are forced to deal with the disrespect that plant officials must now have for the FSIS, the product of a clearly flawed enforcement standard. If failing the salmonella performance standards was as a result of sanitation failures at Supreme Beef, then why was the plant not shut down for SSOP non-compliances? The FSIS administration refuses to acknowledge that Salmonella can be found in the source materials used in beef grinding operations, because it compromises the enforcement of their ludicrous salmonella performance standards. It is interesting that in the FSIS Generic HACCP Model for Raw, Ground Meat and Poultry Products, a CCP is recommended at receiving, based on the fact that "Salmonella may be present on incoming raw product". Is there a conflict here? Absolutely. Further, the FSIS expects us to believe that the salmonella standards are science based, will enhance food safety, and are fair to both the meat and the poultry industries. There is nothing scientific, safe or fair about the enormous disparity between the percent positive (for salmonella) allowed for meat as opposed to poultry. Who must face the irate ground beef processor, who, despite PR/HACCP, is denied a "level playing field", and who fully realizes that the FSIS continues to cater to the poultry industry? The in-plant inspector does of course. How many consumers know that up to half (49.9%) of the ground turkey they purchase may be contaminated with salmonella? How many know that the FSIS bureaucrats have deemed that to be acceptable? This is pathogen reduction?

The HIMP controversy continues to rage back and forth. It is important to know just who benefits from HIMP and who does not. FSIS management benefits because they can divert moneys derived from a diminished in-plant workforce to bulk up managerial positions of dubious function and to fund other questionable programs deemed more important than critical frontline positions. The industry benefits from the diminished in-plant presence of thorn-in-their-side inspectors, which clearly translates to greater profits, the inspectors in the HIMP plants who have been awarded promotions by the FSIS benefit, in return for their "support" of the project. Unless HIMP ultimately goes to its demise, as it should, their unscrupulous actions will result in the eventual loss of employment for hundreds of their colleagues. The Research Triangle Institute landed a lucrative FSIS contract to "monitor" HIMP. Consumers are the most significant losers, being left defenseless and vulnerable by the very government entity responsible for ensuring their well being. The FSIS charges that the NJC leadership misrepresented the facts to the media, when describing the unwholesome and diseased carcasses and parts leaving HIMP plants. The inspectors working in the HIMP plants, who are not all union leaders, initially talked to the media. They acted out of pure frustration and sense of duty, after the FSIS refused to address their concerns about the safety and wholesomeness of the product. "Let the system work" was the response. Did the FSIS investigate the inspector's allegations? Absolutely not! Incredibly, the inspectors were investigated, because they dared to tell the truth. Retaliation has become the Agency's ace in the hole. These are not the words and actions of an employer concerned about the morale, the wellness of employees.

Contrary to the "facts" published by the FSIS, HIMP does not, cannot, and will not, ever, improve on food safety. Every in-plant employee knows this, including those who support the program for personal gain. For the overwhelming majority of employees, HIMP raises questions about the ethical fiber of their employer, is a threat to their economic and moral well being, causes a sense of diminished self worth, and is a danger to the health and welfare of the consumer. Besides the obvious far-reaching social harm, it is also illegal! The FSIS management knows it is illegal and unethical, the recent court decision notwithstanding. In 1996, the clandestinely formulated PR/HACCP scheme of deception was being methodically introduced to employees. In August 1996, the FSIS issued an Employee Information document on PR/HACCP. Among other tidbits of misinformation, one statement on page 20 stands out. "Many of the activities carried out in the current inspection program, including carcass by carcass inspection, not only respond to some of the public's most basic expectations of its government but are also required by law. These activities will continue." This statement is clearly representative of the trail of broken promises and outright deception that are now commonplace with the FSIS. Current HACCP related publications continue to include that blatantly false statement. [Emphasis added.] That employees must sue a government agency to force that agency to fulfill its unmistakable statutory obligation speaks volumes about the unhealthy state of labor-management relations. Employees that must continually oppose a government agency because it has forgotten that it exists to serve the people are predisposed to carry discontent into the workplace.

Regulatory HACCP incites continual complaints by the industry that the FSIS has completely ignored any semblance of a common sense approach in rulemaking that would accomplish the objective of the program. Inspector's simply ask, "Where's the science?" Whether one agrees with either mentality or not, it is certain that the FSIS continues it's "command and control" ways unabated. By commanding specific CCP's, additional CCP's, and in particular HACCP plan reassessments, whether appropriate or not, the FSIS inexorably takes control over the plant's HACCP system, contrary to the intent of the final rule, contrary to what inspectors were told, and contrary to promises made to the industry. The in-plant inspector, who was ordered, unequivocally, to cease "command and control", must now enforce the orders passed down, take control, and command that industry complies. What's wrong with this scenario? Who must contend with the plant owner faced with the possibility of a financially disastrous shut down? Who faces the animosity; the hostility? Certainly not the bureaucrat firmly ensconced in the safety of a cushy chair, dealing only with faceless names, and by remote control. Once again, it is the field employee. HACCP has become the acronym for Hardly Anyone Comprehends Current Policy, least of all those who must enforce it.

Upon occasion, FSIS bureaucrats feign benevolence, but only when their self-serving public image may be tarnished. Even then, their actions breed adverse consequences. Witness the dawn of January 25, 2000. HACCP, phase three is in effect. All very small plants must be in compliance with 9 CFR 417. The in-plant inspector's orders were very specific. If the plant did not comply, an N.R. was written, inspection was withheld, the D.O. suspended operations, Compliance was notified, etc. Sounds reasonable. After all, very small plants did have two full years to get ready. It is reported that most plants, some albeit struggling through the eleventh hour, did indeed meet the deadline. But, what of those that did not? Incredibly, the FSIS promptly rewarded those plants for their lack of effort. Unbeknownst to field inspectors, the FSIS had, months before, prepared a Notice of Abeyance (of suspension). This notice suspended inspection but held the suspension in abeyance, thereby granting the delinquent plant an additional 180 days to produce an "adequate" HACCP plan, with no further enforcement action. In some cases, plant management actually received copies of the notice before the inspector could deliver the N.R., nullifying the withholding of inspection before it was even officially delivered in writing.. The FSIS made the inspector look like a fool, the inspector felt like a fool, and plant management laughs. Does the FSIS administration care? Hardly! The only concern was the criticism the agency would be subjected to if a number of very small plants were shut down on the 25th. So concerned was the FSIS about this criticism, all very small plants were sent a packet containing a 20 minute HACCP video and a 27 page Pamphlet. Simply by reviewing the material, they had become HACCP experts in less than an hour, and therefore met the training requirements of 417.7. Those within the industry who were earlier forced to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars to attend HACCP seminars, in order to meet the requirements were rightfully very angry. In addition, many HACCP plans did not satisfy the requirements of 417, and it is safe to say, still do not, as of this writing. The in-plant inspector had to contend with the animosity created between regulator and regulated solely because of the indiscretion of the FSIS.

What does the in-plant inspector of the new millennium look forward to when he/she reports for duty each day? Among a myriad of other critical responsibilities, we review HACCP plans for each product initially and on a continuous basis thereafter. We assure that the plant has addressed all possible biological, chemical and physical hazards associated with the production of an endless array of products, from simple to extremely complex.. We review the attendant records, and through direct observation, attempt to verify that the actual production process reflects the HACCP plan, and within the context of the regulations. Despite our efforts, we are continually reminded by the FSIS that we do not possess the mental capacity to perform meaningful PR/HACCP assessments, or to make "scientifically" valid food safety decisions. We are informed that only 696 qualified individuals are capable of providing assessments in this regard, due to their cognitive powers which we, the uneducated, do not enjoy. We are therefore, by carefully calculated design, handcuffed by the FSIS in that we may not require additional CCP's, or meaningful critical limits, in spite of the fact that without them, it is doubtful that the intent of 417 is met. [Emphasis added.] Perhaps if the FSIS had allowed us full use of our abilities, the recent OIG report on the status of HACCP plans in various plants would not have been so scathing. Such latitude was not given, because the FSIS cannot allow it's present in-plant workforce to display any semblance of intelligence. That would not comport with Agency plans to replace most of us with a few superhero 696 "qualified" individuals. We are relegated to what is intentionally, sarcastically described as "poking and sniffing", and reading SSOP and HACCP records that could very well be fabricated. Did the FSIS even consider what effect this might have on its workforce? That animosity might build between the "unqualified" and those that would eventually replace them? That a possibly irreparable Agency/employee rift would develop? If so, it was obviously discounted as unworthy of concern. Even worse, the industry is privy to all FSIS employer/employee communications. The industry has little reason to respect the inspector whose employer advises does not " possess all the skills necessary to perform inspection fully consistent with HACCP precepts." The inspector who receives no respect is certainly likely to respond in kind. The power of potentially crippling authority combined with the fear of that authority, in an atmosphere lacking respect, is a formula for disaster.

In response to the tragedy in San Leandro, the FSIS has resurrected its WORKPLACE PRINCIPLES memo, which was published in 1996. It is interesting to note that it is directed specifically to Agency/industry field personnel. The memo therefore implies that all violence that may occur is as a consequence of the unprofessional behavior of field personnel, whether industry or FSIS. By purposeful omission, the memo contains nothing to indicate that the FSIS administration, from which all policy flows, will adhere to the very principles they advocate. As such, it seeks to exonerate the administration of any responsibility for tensions or violent acts that have occurred or may occur in the future. In that respect, the memo further implies that the policies, rules and regulations of the FSIS, which field employees Must enforce and the industry must comply with, are essentially benign in nature, and can only lead to tension or conflict due to the impaired working relationships of field personnel. Nothing published by the FSIS is surprising anymore, but the seriousness of the issue begs for honesty, compassion and purposeful action, not disassociation.

The FSIS must initiate and publish a forthright, complete chronology of the enforcement actions and other pertinent events that preceded the San Leandro tragedy. Ignorance of the past leaves us dangerously unprepared for the future. FSIS management must then read, very, very carefully the principles it advocates for field employees, and conduct an honest self-analysis to determine whether they, themselves, adhere to those principles. They do not. Consider the facts. Employee/employer relations have been strained to the breaking point, eliciting charges and counter charges in memos, letters, and the media. The Food Chemical News Daily reported that, in the first half of 1999, unexcused absences on workdays by field employees increased by 177% over 1998 and sick leave jumped 25%. These are the reactions of unhappy and overworked people, to say the least. The minutes of Agency/NJC consultations read more like dogfights than they do rational people discussing critical policy issues. Field employees are disgusted, disenfranchised, and kept purposefully uninformed by the FSIS management. Despite the efforts of the NJC, they are eliminated from participation in the formulation and implementation of all regulatory and personnel policies. Many have genuine concerns about an eventual RIF that threatens their very sustenance and economic well being, and are furious at being routinely deceived, and demeaned, by their employer. Each day, already under personal stress caused by the actions of a disingenuous employer, they must deal with plant personnel who perceive them as a genuine threat and who do not want them there. This is an FSIS created environment that has transformed employees into outsiders, and has provided all of the necessary ingredients, as well as the conduit for confrontation.

That the FSIS is genuinely concerned about workplace violence is unquestionable. However, this concern, in the absence of positive remedial action that will translate into a palpable lessening of tensions, a healing process, for and between all entities, is meaningless. The physical safety and mental health of FSIS personnel, demands otherwise. FSIS management should begin by simply utilizing tried and true, time-honored standards for healthy employer/employee relations. Responsible, successful leaders provide employees with motivation, empowerment, inspiration and goal-oriented guidance. The result is a workforce instilled with self-esteem, team spirit, pride, trust and high morale. People endowed with these qualities are less likely to precipitate conflict themselves and are more likely to be able to avoid or resolve situations in which conflict can or does arise.

That being true, we as employees offer the following to the FSIS administration. Talk to us truthfully, and we will listen intently, and with open minds. Involve us, and we will participate honestly and proudly. Empower us, and we will work diligently to achieve mutual goals that are beneficial to those we serve. Support us, and together we will build a better tomorrow. Listen to us, and you will be surprised at the depth of our knowledge.

Distributed by...
http://www.The-Inspector.com Alan Shadduck -- Grand Island, Nebraska USA FAX 308.395.8718 alan@the-inspector.com

Glossary

696: A level of qualification for people administering HACCP.

AFGE: American Federation of Government Employees. The inspectors' union.

CCP: Critical control point. See HACCP.

FSIS: Food Safety & Inspection Service, part of USDA. Meat/poultry inspectors work for FSIS.

HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points. A method of controlling a process by identifying 'critical' points during the process where something might go wrong, and instituting 'controls' at those points. For example, a critical control point in a commercial kitchen might be the temperature of the freezer, because if the temperature gets too high--even for a few hours--the food might defrost and bacteria would grow. The 'critical control' must be checked regularly to see that it is working--in this case, the thermometer in the freezer. HACCP was promoted by the USDA as a supplement to traditional "poke and sniff" inspection, but instead is being used to replace it.

HIMP: HACCP Inspections Model Program. Slaughter or processing plants that are testing HACCP.

NJC: National Joint Council. The leadership of the inspectors' union.

N.R. An inspection report

San Leandro: An incident in which a sausage-company owner shot to death three government inspectors who had been writing negative things about his company

USDA: US Department of Agriculture