February 19, 2004 The Oregonian

The leaders of a House investigation into the Northwest's mad-cow-disease incident think the U.S. Department of Agriculture's handling of the case raises some credibility questions. That's putting it mildly.

Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman and her agency have been insisting, in the face of contrary evidence, that the animal that launched the crisis in the American beef industry was a so-called "downer" cow, easily distinguishable from other cattle being taken to slaughter.

But, as reporters for The Oregonian discovered last month, several witnesses say otherwise. The House investigators discovered that a USDA veterinarian did identify the animal as a downer, but that it later stood up and was taken to slaughter.

This is important because it suggests that animals with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad-cow disease, are not as easily identifiable as they were once presumed to be.

More to the point, it means the system to assure the safety of meat is miscalibrated and needs changing.

"Clearly it's not safe to assume that all infected cattle will be downers," said David Marin, a spokesman for the House committee on government reform, which conducted the investigation.

"That in turn has serious implications for the Agriculture Department's surveillance program and serious ramifications for the information that has been shared with the public."

Yes, indeed.

It is slightly better news that some safeguards almost worked in this case. The fact the animal initially was classified as a "downer" suggests that potentially infected animals generally are culled from the system. It was also heartening to learn the slaughterhouse and cattle hauler involved both have specific policies against accepting downer cows.

The Northwest case also has led to quick rule changes by the USDA and the Food and Drug Administration banning practices such as the use of animal protein in animal feed and increasing the energy and frequency of USDA inspections.

If the observations of the House investigators turn out to be generally true, though, further tightening of the inspection regime will be necessary.

The other problem here is that the agriculture secretary and the agency did not know -- or did not share with Congress or the public -- the new information about BSE symptoms. It makes us wonder what would have happened if the congressional committee had not investigated.

We won't speculate as to the reasons for not sharing the information, but it hardly matters. If the department simply failed to understand the importance of giving the public correct, useful information, that's bad enough.

If the department decided willfully to keep the information to itself, then those responsible -- including the secretary of agriculture -- should lose their jobs.